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The First Amendment and Commercial Speech
C. EDWIN BAKER*
INTRODUCTION
The world would do well not to follow the lead of the United States in its view that
commercial speech is an aspect of free speech. If guidance were sought, rather than the
current American view developed over the last thirty years, greater wisdom would be
found in the earlier American view that commercial speech has nothing to do with such
freedom. With this in mind, Part II of this Article offers three arguments that I have
previously advanced for excluding commercial speech from First Amendment
protection and one additional argument that, though I have never offered it, is
provocative and I largely endorse. First, however, Part I gives a very brief history of
the U.S. constitutional treatment of commercial speech and a possibly controversial
characterization of its current status.
I. HISTORY
Though the constitutional idea of free speech had a robust political life in the United
States during the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the Supreme Court first gave
free speech serious attention in the twentieth century. Even then, the Court did not find
a federal statute to violate the First Amendment until 1965 in Lamont v. Postmaster
General.1 Nevertheless, ever since the early 1930s, U.S. courts have actively protected
speech and press freedom. Still, little thought was given to commercial advertising.
When the constitutional status of commercial speech first reached the Supreme Court
in Valentine v. Chrestensen,2 the Court spent three sentences disposing of it: one to

* Nicholas F. Gallicchio Professor of Law and Professor of Communication, University
of Pennsylvania Law School. This Article was originally delivered as a conference paper at a
symposium held by the Center for American Law of the University of Paris II (Panthéon-Assas)
on January 18–19, 2008. For the French version of this Article, see C. Edwin Baker, Le Premier
Amendement et la publicité commerciale, in LA LIBERTÉ D’EXPRESSION AUX ÉTATS-UNIS ET EN
EUROPE 9 (Élisabeth Zoller ed., 2008). The normative theory that constitutes the substance of
this Article can be found in Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 IOWA
L. REV. 1 (1976), and more fully developed in HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH
(1989). I developed the argument of Part II.C in Property and its Relation to Constitutionally
Protected Liberty, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 741 (1986). The current state of law on commercial
speech is described in Paternalism, Politics, and Citizen Freedom: The Commercial Speech
Quandary in Nike, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1161 (2004). Not discussed here, but important to
understanding commercial speech, is the constitutional distinction between the (commercial)
press and those commercial speakers who are properly subject to regulation, and the difference
between the constitutional rationales for protecting individual speech and for protecting the
commercial press. In addition to the first two sources cited above, I consider these issues
primarily in Turner Broadcasting: Content-Based Regulation of Persons and Presses, 1994 SUP.
CT. REV. 57, and The Independent Significance of the Press Clause Under Existing Law, 35
HOFSTRA L. REV. 955 (2007).
1. 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
2. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
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state the issue, a second to say that if the behavior regulated had not been commercial
advertising then the First Amendment would restrain the state’s power to regulate, and
a third that said the Court was “clear that the Constitution imposes no such restraint on
government as respects to purely commercial advertising.”3 This quick disposal
remained the law for over thirty years. During this period, the only doctrinal issue that
concerned the Court was whether something was properly characterized as commercial
speech. It concluded, for example, that despite newspapers’ commercial goal of being
profitable businesses, neither a newspaper’s content nor a newspaper advertisement
placed by civil rights leaders discussing public issues constituted commercial speech.4
The 1950s and 1960s saw a huge proliferation of First Amendment scholarship but
virtually none that dealt with commercial speech. With the exception of a somewhat
perfunctory treatment by Thomas Emerson, who saw commercial speech as part of the
system of commerce, not the system of free expression, and Alexander Meiklejohn,
who dismissed commercial advertising as not related to the democratic political ideal
of self-government, no theoretical explanation for denial of protection was offered.5
Then Martin Redish, in an important article, stepped into this vacuum. He argued that
commercial speech could not be distinguished from any category of protected speech
in its capacity to provide the public with information that is relevant both to people’s
personal lives and to their political decisions or in any other constitutionally relevant
dimension.6 Redish’s argument quite explicitly, as does marketplace of ideas theory
more generally, took the perspective of the audience for the speech. Here, the
relevance of its content to them was the crucial concern. It should also be noted that as
of the early 1970s, with the exception of Emerson’s broader four-function theory,
virtually all First Amendment scholarship and the dominant doctrinal formulations
accepted some version of a marketplace of ideas theory.7
Then in 1976, a case came before the Court involving a statute that prohibited
pharmacists from advertising the price of prescription drugs.8 Clarifying a decision
from the year before that protected as free speech an advertisement for abortion
services, the Court established the modern view that the First Amendment protects
commercial speech. The Court’s reasoning, clearly adopting a marketplace of ideas
theory that emphasized the informative value of commercial speech to its audience,
offered arguments that duplicated those that Redish had advanced several years before.
The Court did suggest, however, that regulations of commercial speech were likely
constitutionally justifiable if the commercial speech were false or misleading (imagine
the silence of politicians that would follow if law prohibited misleading political
huckstering); if the advertising were for an illegal product or transaction (although the
Court fully protects advocacy of law violation under the First Amendment); or if the
regulation related to the time, place, and manner of commercial speech. The Court

3. Id. at 54.
4. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
5. See THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (1970); ALEXANDER
MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948), reprinted in
POLITICAL FREEDOM 3 (1965).
6. See Martin H. Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace: Commercial Speech
and the Values of Free Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429 (1971).
7. See, e.g., C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 6–25 (1989).
8. See Va. Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
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stated that general First Amendment rules against prior restraints (e.g., pre-approval
schemes) may not apply, and requirements that advertisements include warning or
other informational content apparently would be permitted. In protecting commercial
speech, however, the Court clearly concluded that commercial advertising can serve all
the purposes related to informing audiences that other protected speech performs.
Virginia Board remained the lead case until the Supreme Court purported to
summarize the law and established the current, though much criticized, four-part
doctrinal test in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of
New York.9 This balancing test indicated that the state could regulate commercial
speech, not only when the commercial speech would be excluded from First
Amendment protection under Virginia Board (for example, because the speech was
false or misleading or because it promoted a product whose sale was itself illegal), but
also if the state’s interest was substantial, if the regulation directly advanced the
interest, and if the regulation was no more extensive than necessary to advance it. In
Central Hudson, New York, in pursuit of an environmental interest in preventing
excess energy use, had barred a broad range of electric utility companies’ advertising.
Although the Court invalidated the regulation, noting for example that the law
prevented advertisements that advised consumers to shift their electric usage to place
less demand on the system or to purchase energy-saving devices, the Court indicated
that it would uphold a ban if it only prohibited advertising that promoted behavior that
contradicted the state’s conservation objectives.10
Ever since Virginia Board, both before and after Central Hudson, the Court has
swung back and forth between weaker and stronger protection of commercial speech.
As of 2007, though, the trend is apparently toward being more protective. Although the
judiciary is usually quite deferential to the government’s characterization of its interest
as serious, that is, a “substantial” interest, the Central Hudson test gives courts
considerable leeway in determining whether the law directly advances the state’s
purported interest and whether the regulation is more extensive than necessary.
Sometimes invalidation seems merely to reflect a law’s apparent sheer stupidity in
relation to its announced purpose. For example, who would think that to advance an
interest in preventing children from smoking or even the more attenuated interest in
avoiding their exposure to advertising for tobacco products, a requirement that ads in
stores be placed over five feet above the store floor effectively advance the interest? 11
Did Massachusetts believe its young people always hung their heads and looked at the
ground? This is not to say that the Court has not also struck down much more plausible
regulations. The point here is that the Central Hudson test usually gives courts plenty
of room to maneuver.
Beyond its manipulability, the primary criticism of the Central Hudson test is that it
apparently authorizes what critics identify as paternalism, an approach that had
arguably been repudiated in the initial case of Virginia Board. Under Central Hudson,
if the state has a substantial interest in preventing some legal behavior, it purportedly
can “paternalistically” prevent people from receiving argument or information that
promotes the behavior, such as advertisements promoting increased electrical usage.12

9.
10.
11.
12.

447 U.S. 557 (1980).
See id. at 569–71.
See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001).
See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563–64; cf. Daniel Hays Lowenstein, “Too Much
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Nevertheless, it should be—but almost never is—noted that this assertion of
paternalism is not quite right. As Justice Rehnquist first pointed out in his Virginia
Board dissent, regulations of commercial speech are never blanket prohibitions on
provision of any category of information or argument. They are not inartful attempts to
keep people ignorant by preventing them from receiving information. Rather, they are
direct efforts to prevent or regulate the participation of certain speakers in a
discourse.13 The regulations always apply only to a specified class of commercial
speakers.14 For example, the regulations at issue in Virginia Board only prohibited
pharmacists from advertising their drug prices—the press, public interest
organizations, and individuals were left free to publicize this information to the extent
they chose to do so. A regulation of a tobacco company’s advertising does not prohibit
people from telling their friends that smoking is sexy, safe, fun, or any other stupid and
harmful opinion they want to offer. The law does not impede freedom of private or
pubic discourse among people and in the press. Similarly, legislation barring corporate
entities from placing political advertisements promoting their preferred candidate for
public office does not paternalistically bar people from expressing or hearing content
favoring or opposing particular candidates, but only restricts the public discourse to
speakers other than non-media commercial entities. The paternalism, if it is to be called
that, is about limiting participation in a particular communication sphere or particular
debate to non-commercial agents and to the press. Discourse in the press and among all
citizens and non-commercial associations is unrestrained. Still, some Justices, most
prominently Justice Thomas, have made the factually false claim concerning
paternalism—that the aim of regulating commercial speech is to “keep[]people
ignorant by suppressing expression,”15 as well as indicating impatience with any
constitutional distinction between commercial speech and other speech.
There is much more to be said about the current state of doctrine and scholarly
debates. For the last thirty years, commercial speech has been one of the most prolific
subjects of both Supreme Court decisions and scholarly commentary in the free speech
area—though I might add that this prominence is hardly accidental or due solely to the
intrinsic interest of the subject. Not only do corporate interests bring almost all the
litigation, finding it possibly the most potent constitutional ground for invalidating
governmental economic regulation since the demise of Lochner in 1937,16 but these
corporate interests have also paid for many of the conferences and many of the papers
that initiated and sustained interest in the subject. I will put these debates aside.
Instead, I outline three separate arguments, each of which I accept as adequate in itself,

Puff”: Persuasion, Paternalism, and Commercial Speech, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1205, 1238
(1988).
13. See Va. State Bd. of Pharm., 425 U.S. at 782–83 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
14. The one arguable exception to the claim in the text was a federal rule that prohibited (in
the case of broadcasters in states that barred lotteries) the broadcast of information about
lotteries. The law would appear to apply to a broadcast station, for example in its news program,
from listing the winning numbers of the state lottery in a neighboring state. The Court, however,
found the law inapplicable to this type of situation by interpreting it to apply only to
advertisements, not news, about the lottery, thus following the distinction offered in the text
above. United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418 (1993).
15. Lorillard Tobacco, 533 U.S. at 575 (Thomas, J., concurring).
16. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), overruled by W. Coast Hotel v. Parrish,
300 U.S. 379 (1937).
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and then favorably mention one more for denying all First Amendment protection for
the speech of profit-oriented enterprises—a category that includes what has been
described as commercial speech.
II. REASONS TO DENY PROTECTION
I have long advanced a strongly libertarian interpretation of the First Amendment
freedom of speech: it should protect an individual’s meaningfully expressive behavior,
including speech.17 An adequate premise for this view is the notion that the legitimacy
of legal order requires that the government respect individual autonomy. In addition, I
argue that this respect for people’s autonomy, plus respect for people’s fundamental
equality, provides the basic normative rationale for democracy. Respect for people’s
autonomy, for a person’s choices about herself, explains why the government must not
aim to restrain a person’s speech. Unlike the marketplace of ideas theory, this
interpretation of free speech relates most overtly to the speaker—she gets to choose
what she wants to say—although indirectly it also provides for the autonomy of the
listener in that the law must not stop her from trying to hear anything that someone else
has a right to and chooses to say to her. Moreover, unlike the purely instrumental value
of speech in a marketplace search for truth (an instrumental value that is arguably often
better advanced by intelligent regulation than by anarchy in a speech agora), this
argument is basically non-instrumental in nature. The question here is what the
implications of this view are for the commercial sphere.
A. Autonomy and Market Dictates
Max Weber describes modernity as crucially involving the separation of the
economy from the household.18 His iron cage of rationalization pictures the modern
market as effectively dictating to all participants that they adopt the most efficient
behavior. In this view, a firm has no freedom except to adopt ever more profitable
techniques. Since any commercial entity must reproduce its capital to continue, it must
meet any efficiency challenge generated by a competitor—failure to do so causes
bankruptcy to loom. At least as long as markets are fully competitive, real freedom of
choice exists only in the non-rationalized realms such as the household or politics, not
in the efficient behavior of market participants. This, of course, does not deny that
individuals lucky enough to have various employment options do have choices—
because they are individuals rather than capital-reproducing entities, the market does
not force them to seek the most profitable employment. Their employers, though, and
the individual employee once having taken the job, must behave so or the employer’s
capital and the employees’ jobs are put at risk. The simplest example is a tobacco or
whiskey company. Even if the stockholders, board of directors, top management,
marketing personnel, and other employees all believe that smoking or drinking is bad
for one’s health and should be avoided, the company’s continuance depends on its
speech effectively promoting the profitable sale of its products. On pain of losing out

17. See BAKER, supra note 7.
18. See generally MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich
eds., 1968).
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to its competitors, if the company’s expression fails at this, it ceases as a business
enterprise.
The observation that freedom does not exist in the market turns out to be a point on
which conservative free market economists—in the United States, the Chicago School
types—agree with Marxists, who critique not so much the capitalists but capitalism.
The main difference is that the free market economists see the market as dictating what
they describe as efficiency but what the Marxists describe as alienation. Both, however,
argue that the market dictates profit-maximizing (purportedly efficient) behavior and,
presumably, dictates speech that the firm believes most advances that goal.
Three of the dissenters in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,19 a case
invalidating a state law banning corporate expenditures that promote the corporation’s
views relating to a ballot measure, saw this point in explaining why they would deny
protection to corporate political speech:
[W]hat some have considered to be the principal function of the First Amendment,
the use of communication as a means of self-expression, self-realization, and selffulfillment, is not at all furthered by corporate speech. It is clear that the
communications of profitmaking corporations . . . do not represent a manifestation
of individual freedom or choice.20

Though a dissent then, these views later carried the day in a similar case, Austin v.
Michigan State Chamber of Commerce,21 which upheld a ban on corporate
expenditures promoting candidates for office, and they currently provide the rationale
for largely denying constitutional protection to corporate political speech.22 My claim
is that this feature of not manifesting individual freedom is a proper reason to deny
First Amendment protection for commercial speech.
Three important observations—one about history, one about application, and one
about structures—concerning this argument for denying protection to the speech of
market enterprises should be noted. The argument assumes the existence of the largely
competitive market that economists widely observe and Marxists describe. Weber saw
this market realm as central to the modern process of rationalization. Jürgen Habermas
sees it as creating a systems realm on which modern society relies in order to relieve
coordination problems that would become unmanageable for a complex modern
society if left to communicative practices of what he describes as the lifeworld.23 Much
law assumes this division between the market enterprise and the lifeworld. Tax codes,
for example, purport to be able to distinguish business expenses and personal
expenditures. Business expenses are viewed as a necessary cost, created by market
demand, and thus, deserving of a tax deduction. In contrast, personal expenditures are
viewed as a reflection of personal values and individual needs, and thus, undeserving
of a deduction. In the United States, corporate law often imposes duties on boards or

19. 435 U.S. 765, 802 (1978) (White, J., dissenting).
20. Id. at 804–05.
21. 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
22. McConnell v. Fed. Elections Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003). But cf. Fed. Elections
Comm’n v. Wis. Right to Life, 127 S. Ct. 2652 (2007).
23. See, e.g., 2 JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION: LIFEWORLD
AND SYSTEM: A CRITIQUE OF FUNCTIONALIST REASON (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1987).
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management to be oriented toward profitability for the ultimate benefit of equity
holders. Nevertheless, this market realm is explicitly historical, and if the economic
order were structured differently, this argument would not justify denying protection to
commercial speech.
In addition to the argument being historically bound, it must recognize “slippage.”
The real world diverges in varying degrees from the world of market determination
described here. Sometimes monopolistic circumstances allow management to spend
potential profits and sometimes workers or other stake-holders will be willing and able
to accept lower wages or interest rates essentially to subsidize practices that embody
ideals other than market-demanded economic efficiency. Nothing said here commits
First Amendment theory to how it should respond to this slippage away from marketdemanded efficiency. In fact, one commentator has raised the question of whether, if
our ethical ideals for economic life and economic organization diverge from the model
described here, constitutional principles should assume this existing order, or instead,
should in some way reflect or protect this ethical alternative.24
Finally, the specifically structural orientation of this analysis must be emphasized.
The observation is commonplace that a person’s circumstances or context influences (a
social scientist might claim causes or determines) her speech. Certainly, the electoral
context strongly influences many candidates to compete by saying what they believe
will result in electoral victory. Nevertheless, the candidate can choose to express her
true values and make the arguments that she believes. The ideal of the political realm—
the ideal of when it operates properly—and an ideal of much of life in both the public
and private portions of the lifeworld view people as having freedom to, and as properly
choosing to, express their real values and allegiances. This attributed freedom reflects a
structural view that characterizes expenditures in these realms as value-based
consumption rather than inherent attempts at reproducing capital. In contrast, the
structural ideal of a modern commercial market—the market sphere when it works
properly—is precisely to dictate an instrumental orientation toward efficiency and
profit, the behavior that economists like to say leads to placing resources in their
highest and best uses (at least, purportedly does so given the market measure of value).
For this reason, attributing potential freedom to the actor is not appropriate in the
market sphere but is appropriate elsewhere. Both attributions of lack of freedom in one
and freedom in the other represent the ideal characterizations of their respective
spheres. Thus, regulation of commercial speech does not, but regulation of speech in
other arenas does, deny the respect for the autonomy that the state must attribute to
people.
B. Speech of Artificial, Instrumentally Justified Entities
Business enterprises in general—commercial corporations even more obviously—
are legal entities created for essentially instrumental reasons. These entities allow the
economy to operate effectively in the modern world. Despite being vitally important,
their merely instrumental rationale leaves them with a morally different status than
living, flesh-and-blood people—the people who Kant argues must be valued as ends

24. See Seana V. Shiffrin, Compelled Association, Morality, and Market Dynamics, 41
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 317 (2007).
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and whose ultimate value a legitimate state must respect.25 This difference certainly
explains why, under any theory centered on the moral importance of individual liberty
(the formal right to make, stupidly or wisely, choices about oneself), individuals’ right
to make speech choices has constitutional status while these entities’ rights do not.
Of course, people make up commercial entities’ animating parts, but the status of
people’s acts within these structures—and the rights and obligations, even the
existence of these entities—is ultimately determined by law. People within the legal
framework of these entities act as an element of the entity, but they always also leave
these roles at times and act in the lifeworld, the household, and the public sphere,
where they make choices as individuals. The law constantly treats a person’s acts that it
attributes to the commercial entity differently than acts within the rest of a person’s
life. Tax law, for example, must allow deductions for business expenses in order to
make income taxes on businesses coherent, while for individuals the law sensibly taxes
all income (not revenue minus expenses). Essentially, for instrumental reasons of
efficiency, these artificial entities are given potentially perpetual life, but when it
becomes socially useful to put any one of them “to death,” the law does so with
dispatch without creating any moral qualms that the death penalty famously raises for
flesh-and-blood people.
This last point about the death penalty can be generalized. Moral and political
theory simply does not demand that the state respect the business entity’s autonomy or
its liberty; rather, normative theory demands that the state design these entities—give
them existence, rights, and obligations—in a manner crafted to serve societal interests.
Given business enterprises’ artificial nature and instrumental justification, the law
should regulate them to serve flesh-and-blood people, not equate them in regard to
rights with real people nor allow them to dominate people. For example, though
respect for autonomy should disable majorities from excluding particular people from
public discourses or from barring people’s expression of particular views in their
public or private discourses—we call such limitations censorship—this required
respect for the individual is not offended by shutting out or regulating the extent and
form of participation by these artificial entities.
Importantly, the vulnerability of a commercial entity to regulation of its speech
never leaves the individual, the constitutionally and morally valued agent, unfree. Part
of an individual’s nature is that even though she plays roles within the commercial
realm, she always leaves that context at points; whenever she does, she is entirely free
to speak as she will. The law often draws these lines—determining whether to attribute
speech (or other activities, for example, tortious acts on which to premise liability) to
the corporation on the basis of factors such as whether the speaker was charging
expenses to the corporation, taking business expense deductions for these expenses, or
being paid for her time related to the speech.
Some commentators rightly observe that regulation of these artificial entities
disfavors certain views—those otherwise promoted by the market. But the legal order
always favors or disfavors various views, most obviously by how it distributes wealth
or spends tax money on its own expression. With no natural baseline, it is difficult to
see why conscious efforts to improve existing baselines of expressive influence, as long

25. See IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON (Thomas Kingsmill Abbott
trans., Dover Publ’ns 2004) (1788); cf. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
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as using means consistent with respecting people’s autonomy, are problematic.
Everyone is left free to argue her own position on her own with whatever resources she
is able to muster. In passing, I note a ubiquitous argument often presented to me in
conversation, most persistently by Martin Redish. By regulating commercial speech on
a particular subject, it is argued, the law biases debate. When a view is so wrongheaded that no real individuals would advance it, regulation of commercial speech will
sometimes prevent speech from the only source that will present a particular view in a
serious, sustained manner. Putting aside the empirical truth of this claim (for example,
whether instead a teenager’s peer will actually be the most powerful advocate of
smoking cigarettes), the answer is twofold. First, there is little obvious baseline to
establish when the debate is unbiased. Different communications occur depending on
how the law determines distribution of income or communicative power. If there is to
be a proper baseline, the most obvious possibility is for it to reflect lack of restraint on
individuals to say what they want when speaking for themselves or, more radically, it is
proper only if all individuals have equal resources to commit to their expression. This
leads to the second response to the possibility of mandating silence by these entities:
“so what?” If no real flesh-and-blood person subscribes to the merits of a particular
viewpoint, the concept of freedom provides no reason for creating a “flat earth society”
that makes money by trying to persuade people to adopt particular beliefs.
In the United States, the Supreme Court repudiated the so-called Lochner era, which
typically found that business regulation unconstitutionally infringed on individual
liberty. Historically, this change occurred roughly simultaneously with the beginning of
vigorous protection of speech freedom. An obvious explanation would be that the
Court saw constitutional liberty as essentially a matter for individuals operating outside
the commercial sphere while viewing commercial entities more instrumentally. Justice
Rehnquist was a modern Justice who often reasoned in a manner similar to Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes, a leading proponent of repudiating Lochner. Thus, it is not
surprising that Rehnquist should offer precisely this argument in his persistent
opposition to protecting commercial speech. In his dissent in Virginia Board, for
example, Rehnquist quoted the statement in the anti-Lochner case, Williamson v. Lee
Optical Co.,26 which upheld a state prohibition on advertisements for eyeglass frames.
There the Court stated: “We see no constitutional reason why a State may not treat all
who deal with the human eye as members of a profession who should use no
merchandising methods for obtaining customers.”27 In a later dissent outlining
essentially the same argument given here for denying speech rights to business
corporations, Rehnquist went back even further. He quoted Chief Justice John
Marshall’s description of “the status of a corporation in the eyes of federal law”:
A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in
contemplation of law. Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only those
properties which the charter of creation confers upon it, either expressly, or as
incidental to its very existence. These are such as are supposed best calculated to
effect the object for which it was created.28

26. 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
27. Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 784 (1976)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Williamson, 348 U.S. at 490).
28. First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 823 (1978) (Rehnquist, J.,
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Rehnquist made the important follow-up point that the law only restricts corporate
participation in public discourse but does not prevent communications by people who
have liberty interests in their speech.29 Thus, in Virginia Board he pointed out that the
statute “only forbids pharmacists to publish this price information. There is no
prohibition against a consumer group . . . collecting and publishing comparative price
information as to various pharmacies in an area.”30 In his Belloti dissent, where he
argued in favor of accepting the broad consensus among most state governments and
the federal government that corporate speech aimed at the political process should be
restricted, Rehnquist likewise observed that “all natural persons, who owe their
existence to a higher sovereign than the Commonwealth, remain as free as before to
engage in political activity.”31
The argument is, therefore, that respect for individual autonomy does not require
protecting the speech of artificially created and instrumentally valued commercial
entities. Mention should be made, however, to an important caveat to this conclusion
that answers an obvious objection. The press—the mass media—is often described as
having one foot in the commercial realm and the other in the democratic public sphere.
This is not the place to treat the constitutional protection of a free press systematically,
but the structural point about the merely instrumental significance of corporate entities
continues to apply. Unlike the rationale for speech freedom, the best rationale for press
freedom relates to the instrumental purpose or point of these entities—to produce
information and vision independent of governmental or legal direction—which
distinguishes their product from that of other businesses. Though of merely
instrumental value, this value, especially including the quality of independence, is
absolutely crucial for a free and democratic society. The point is not that the value of
press freedom is other than instrumental but that this instrumental value, unlike that of
the rest of the commercial sphere, lies precisely in its speech being free of censorious
regulation—and on this ground it is the one business with an explicit constitutional
status.32
C. Power Versus Liberty
A person exercises autonomy most fundamentally by embodying her values in her
actions or chosen inactions. A plausible (roughly libertarian) political theory argues
that the law should presumptively permit (and possibly that a constitution should
protect) these exercises of autonomy when they do not physically restrict another’s use
of her body or property in her actions or otherwise exercise power over her. A person’s
basic autonomy rights should include her own self-expression, engaging with others in
solidarity, or achieving aims by persuasion of others. In contrast, one person’s
constitutionally protected autonomy should not include exercising power over other
people. Many exercises of power should be allowed, but only when they contribute to a
better—fairer, more efficient, or otherwise collectively chosen—society.

dissenting) (quoting Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 250, 303 (1819)).
29. See id. at 827–28.
30. Va. State Bd. of Pharm., 425 U.S. at 782 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
31. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 828 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
32. See Potter Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631 (1975).
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A person’s speech choices constitute an integral aspect of this autonomy, especially
when she is using her speech to express her values or to change the world to
correspond more to what she values. This is true, in any event, as long as she respects
the other’s autonomy in the sense that the other is not only free to reject her expressive
claims, but also to follow her expressive lead by representing his acceptance of her
leadership, or the values or facts that she honestly asserts. The speaker respects the
other’s autonomy when, as is typically true, the speaker leaves the other with this
possibility of choice as to what they want or believe—what Rawls calls consensus as
opposed to modus vivende, or what Habermas calls communicative agreement.33 This
case should be contrasted with a second case where the speaker instrumentally uses lies
or power to get the other to act in a manner she recognizes is likely to be contrary to
his values. In the first case, the speaker relies not on law, deception, or force but only
on her own insight as embodied in her expression to create solidarity with her audience
and, thereby, often to change the world to her liking. A person’s own use of property,
even though it is her property only due to law, within her own activities to embody or
express her values likewise is an aspect of her autonomy. This autonomy aspect of her
use of property applies likewise to its use within joint solidaristic activities with others
where each party values both her and the other’s activity.
The question here is whether this autonomy encompasses changing the world
through voluntary market exchanges. Two claims are defended below. First, the typical
speech situation involves an attempt at persuasion—to create a solidarity—while the
typical offer of a market transaction is an attempt to exercise power (in an instrumental
effort to rearrange resources) without solidarity, that is, without the transferor
substantively valuing the transferee getting what transferee wants, and vice versa. More
money is not a better argument. It is more power. Second, though society often benefits
from market transactions (as well as many other exercises of power), exercises of
power of one person over another should be subject to collective regulation while
exercises of persuasion and creation of solidarities almost never should be.34
In many quarters, the first point will be most the controversial. The typical
description of a market exchange is that it is (or at least should be) voluntary, with both
parties wanting to participate, and that the exchange makes both better off than they
were before. Those points I largely accept. Still, my claim is that, phenomenologically
and structurally, market transactions are mutual exercises of power of one over
another. When B offers S one dollar in exchange for S’s apple pie (Americans are fond
of apple pies), B seeks to get S to do something. The same is true when B tells S that
she may shoot S in the head but offers not to if S gives her the pie. In each case, S does
not substantively want B to have the pie but transfers it to B, if she does, because of the
value S places on B’s “offer.” Of course, if S really does value B’s having the pie, even
if the law prohibited S’s exercise of power (that is, prohibited S’s offer to pay or not to

33. See generally JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A
DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY (William Rehg trans.,1996); JOHN RAWLS,
POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993).
34. I should note that the term “persuasion” here is actually somewhat distortive of the vast
range of communicative uses of speech that receive constitutional protection, but at least in most
cases, any harm or benefit that results from the protected speech involves the listener’s mental
assimilation and then her agreement, disagreement, appreciation, or other reaction to the
message.
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shoot), S is normally free to give B the pie. And, of course, it works both ways—B can
charitably or loyally give S money and can peacefully avoid mayhem. S’s possession of
the pie gave S the capacity to exercise power over B—to get B to pay one dollar or
keep B from shooting. In each case, absent B’s exercise of power, S would prefer to
keep her pie. S treats her pie in this context purely instrumentally—just as B similarly
treats her money or gun—while she values it expressively when she shares it with B.
The pie leads to something S wants: the dollar or not being shot. The only difference—
though, of course, noteworthy—is that B normally has a right to transfer the dollar, but
normally no right to shoot (or threaten to shoot). Or, from the other side, normally S
already had a right not to be shot while normally no right to the dollar in B’s pocket.
The question is the significance of that difference. Ultimately, the difference is not
whether S had a choice. If S desperately needed B’s dollar to buy a life saving drug,
even if pies normally sell for two dollars (but with these purchasers now being nowhere
around), S may experience herself as having no choice but to sell to B for one dollar. If
the pie is part of a sacrament in S’s religion but B’s gorging himself would defile that
religion, S may think she has a choice when B puts the gun to her head, deciding to
take the chance of surviving B’s gunshot (and in any event getting to heaven even if B
shoots). Most importantly for my purposes, in both cases, when S transfers possession,
structurally there is no indication that S values B having the pie. Of course, if S is in the
pie business, S wants customers, but often S would be even happier if the customers
simply came and gave S their money without demanding pies in return. Central is that,
in both cases, structurally the interaction only need assume, and often only involves,
instrumental calculations of the two parties. B uses his purported ownership of the
dollar or gun plus trigger hand and S uses her ownership of the pie to get what is
desired, given that the other person will not provide it otherwise. In this fact—the
instrumental use of what she controls to get the other to do what the other otherwise
would not want to do—lies the structural exercise or attempted exercise of power.
Of course, for moral or pragmatic reasons lawmakers conclude some exercises of
power are undesirable and others are desirable—market transactions often (but
certainly not always) lead to efficient, socially desirable allocation of resources. Even
when market transactions are not ideal, legal policies other than barring the transaction
often provide the better response. In other cases, however, the law bars this exchange
use of property, this exercise of power. It does, for example, in respect to how you vote
in elections—you can “give me” but not sell me your vote. And the post-Lochner era
of economic regulations shows that often societies conclude that a transaction (that
does not meet certain conditions) is not desirable and prohibits this exchange-use of
property (usually, on one side, prohibits this exchange-use of money) just as it
prohibits the use of the gun to make a threat. The difference between the situations is
not the forcefulness of the demand or offer. It is neither the voluntariness of the
response nor its beneficial outcome. Rather, the difference, if there is one, lies in the
law. Some exercises of power the legal policy considers desirable to allow, others not.
Despite exceptions, the law (and morality) seldom considers the power that comes
from guns a form of power desirable to promote domestically. Still, though generally
gun use is considered excessive, under appropriate additional circumstances, some
American states have allowed B to shoot S if S is on B’s property without permission
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and if she first “offers” S the option of leaving.35 In contrast, the law—and most but not
all ethical views—considers most market exercises of power desirable to allow, though
sometimes not and it is always a policy matter to identify when it is not. But
structurally, except for this common legal difference, the market and weapon actions
both exercise power where the party initiating the transaction treats what she is capable
of offering (or threatening) purely instrumentally.
I should note that this is not a critique of property. Property consists of many
separate rights, the normative significance of which and the legal, constitutional, and
moral treatment of which vary.36 Most obvious for the present discussion is the
difference between exchange value and use value. The first involves situations where,
at least structurally, the owner treats the property simply instrumentally—to exercise
power over another. The second includes many situations where the owner integrates
the property into her substantively valued activities and chosen life. This distinction
even applies to ways of transferring ownership. In most cases where law forbids market
exchanges, it permits transfers of the same items by means of gift, a gift being a use
that expresses solidarity or other substantive values.37 My most iconoclastic claim is
probably my view that libertarians have been ideologically tricked into identifying the
notion of liberty or autonomy with the first category of property rights. Rather, their
plausible claim should go no further than to emphasize the need for careful explanation
of any limits on a person’s use of her property within her own substantively valued
practices. That is, any plausible libertarian claim should relate to property’s use value,
not its exchange value. And, of course, the initial questions of where to recognize
private property and how to allocate it logically must represent collective choices—the
specific legitimacy of these choices ought to be evaluated on the basis of principles of
justice as well as in terms of their contribution to various collective visions of the good.
As an illustration of the claim here, compare five forms of interaction: persuading,
cooperating, giving, trading, and stealing. In the first three, there is no structural reason
not to think both parties substantively value both their own and the other’s conclusions
or resulting circumstances. They express (or may express) solidarity and association. In
contrast to giving, in trading a person need not value in itself the other’s consequent
possession of what was formally her property. She only values the result—that she now
has something the other previously had. Trading may create an association, but one
only necessarily valued instrumentally—though, of course, this observation does not
deny that a person can substantively value her life as a trader (just as she can
substantively value her life as a thief) and have real concern for her customers. The
claim is only that this affirmative valuation of the other’s situation is not essential to
the structure of “trading” while “giving” creates a form of association whose essential
quality expresses a form of solidarity or other substantive values. The giver values the
other being better off—at least, better off as she the giver sees it.
There is an important parallel to the way speech operates. In persuasion, a speaker
willingly offers, as a “gift,” her own wisdom, knowledge, or vision. Even when the
speaker communicates invective or with a wish to demoralize the other—to insult, for

35. See, e.g., Vann v. State, 64 S.W. 243, 247 (Tex. 1900).
36. See C. Edwin Baker, Property and Its Relation to Constitutionally Protected Liberty,
134 U. PA. L. REV. 741, 742–74 (1986).
37. See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979) (noting that there is no taking where the law
allows a person to possess, give, or devise, but not to sell the artifact).
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example—she offers information or vision that she wants the other to have. In contrast,
unlike with the gift that the speaker willingly transfers, trading or effectively coercive
demands result in a person transferring something with which she would prefer not to
part in order to obtain something she desires. Thus, the autonomy or liberty that is a
central justification of speech freedom in many ways parallels the freedom to make
gifts but is not involved in either market transactions or theft, both of which involve
exercises of power and should be justified or rejected on pragmatic grounds other than
a formal interest in autonomy.
The only further step in this argument is to note that commercial speech is a practice
integrally involved in the aim of consummating profitable market transactions. As
such, it should be subject to regulation on the same basis as any other aspect of this
process. Just like market exchanges themselves, commercial speech is often socially
useful and thus, on pragmatic grounds, should often be allowed. But when commercial
speech impedes any social aim, the law should prohibit or regulate it to remove
dysfunctional aspects or to generate more functional aspects. These points are probably
why Thomas Emerson, the greatest American First Amendment absolutist (who
proposed what he called a “full protection” approach), viewed commercial speech
entirely outside the system of freedom of expression and instead a part of the system of
commerce.38 It is likewise closely related to why John Stuart Mill, despite his adamant
defense of speech freedom, did not think his argument applied to speech promoting
commercial exchanges, speech which could be properly restricted even if the law
properly allows the practice that the speech seeks to promote.39
D. Dissent
Steve Shiffrin has argued that “dissent” ought to be the ruling image of free speech
in America.40 Shiffrin grounds his argument in American history and its romantic
literary tradition, as well as pragmatic arguments concerning an effectively functioning
democracy. In particular, society will better identify and respond to injustices (as well
as simply incompetences) if it encourages rather than suppresses dissent.41 Even if one
accepts an autonomy or liberty theory as the underlying normative rationale of speech
freedom, as a practical matter, autonomy or liberty is seldom threatened except when
embodied in dissent. Thus, dissent is what needs protection. Shiffrin’s conclusions, as
well as his pragmatic observations, ring largely true.
Shiffrin observes that his romantic or reformist vision of dissent is seldom an
attribute of commercial speech—certainly in contexts where regulation has been
fought. The billions of dollars commercial firms commit to advertising, with its
typically mainstream values, overwhelmingly swamp opposing views supported by the
typically tight budgets of those activist groups able to even muster a budget.

38. See EMERSON, supra note 5.
39. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 163–87 (Gertrude Himmelfarb, ed., Pelican
Classics 1974) (1859).
40. STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, DISSENT, INJUSTICE, AND THE MEANINGS OF AMERICA (1999);
STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND ROMANCE (1990).
41. Aspects of Thomas Emerson’s fourth function of free speech, to create a balance
between stability and change, are implicit in Shiffrin’s discussion of dissent. See EMERSON,
supra note 5.
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Commercial advertisers’ speech typically exploits, extends, or defends the status quo,
in this regard consistently diverging from activist dissenters’ typically critical stances
toward the status quo. Thus, commercial speech seldom provides any analogy to the
dissent that Shiffrin argues merits protection. What commercial speech puts in play is
not dissent but unregulated power. Rhetorically, it could be claimed that “regulated”
commercial speech dissents precisely to the majoritarian views justifying regulation.
This definitional trick seems quite disingenuous. Except for the fact of regulation, few
would identify as citizen-based dissent the tobacco companies’ promotion of their
cigarettes, the liquor companies’ promotion of their products, the fast food chains’
promotion of their unhealthy food, or the pharmaceutical companies’ promotion of
their drugs. Occasional attempts to rein in powerful economic forces should not be
mistaken for regulation of dissent. In sum, Shiffrin’s dissent-based theory provides a
reason to typically reject constitutional protection of commercial speech.
Shiffrin’s dissent theory can be seen as a critique of the theories offered above. He
regularly emphasizes “thinking small,” or thinking contextually.42 He invokes Isaiah
Berlin’s admonition to think like a fox, not like a hedgehog. A pragmatic contextualist,
Shiffrin consistently resists sweeping abstract principles of the sort offered in the first
three arguments above. Even if commercial speech typically should not be protected, at
times it does represent dissent. Consider the speech of an artisan commune that selfconsciously seeks to challenge capitalist production. Or consider the speech of organic
farmers who seek to integrate both work and environmental practices and to embody a
vision not of profitability but of human stewardship. This commune may then wish to
advertise (or not support governmentally compelled advertising) precisely to promote
this vision of the world and to create solidarity with customers in expressing this
vision. One question is whether, in these cases, the dissent theory and the other
approaches to commercial speech developed above lead to different conclusions.
Of course, my first argument about market determination was explicitly
contextual—it claimed to be historically grounded and to reflect the dominating
structure of our market economy. The possibility of these dissenting commercial
practices exists only to the extent that—or in contexts where—people are able to and
do take advantage of this structure not having total dominance. Some of these
“dissenting” commercial practices are possible precisely due to contexts where workers
are able, in a sense, to subsidize their economic practice by accepting lower wages.
From a Weberian perspective, they have reintegrated the household and economic
spheres. Where this provides the best description of the speech situation, my first
argument justifying regulation does not apply to this speech.
Seana Shiffrin recently employed similar examples to suggest something like the
following: Grant that collective choice, represented by government power, has proper
sway over the structure of the economic realm. When this government power is not
exercised, it largely leaves this realm to the amoral (not immoral, but specifically
amoral) market.43 Speech regulation in these contexts can rely on collective value
choices to temper the dominance or other consequences of this amoralism. When the
economic sphere is not pervasively regulated on the basis of collective choice,

42. Steven H. Shiffrin, The First Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away from a
General Theory of the First Amendment, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 1212, 1214 (1984).
43. See Shiffrin, supra note 24.
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however, First Amendment commitments should protect those who are able
individually or associatively to struggle against the market’s amoralism by embodying
non-market substantive values into their practices. They may aim to create solidarities
with others in society and to create an ethical alternative to the amoralism of the
market. Sometimes (not always) applying commercial speech regulations would require
these actors to contradict their non-market values. This application is problematic both
from the perspective of the rationale of government regulation—which is to respond to
market amorality—and from the perspective of the autonomy (specifically the
opportunity to dissent and try to create alternative practices) that the First Amendment
protects. Of course, if the self-proclaimed dissenting economic actors are merely
seeking to escape regulation in order to take advantage of amoral market incentives,
they hardly have any right to free ride. They have no claim to opt out just because, in
other respects, their allegiance is to other normative (or sometimes religious) values.
To justify opting out, the regulatory requirements must specifically contradict the value
integration that makes their practice dissenting. This analysis emphasizes that
constitutional norms are misapplied when they contradict the moral ideals they are
designed to embody. Even if in the routine case these moral ideals are part of the
justification of government authority over amoral markets, when people themselves
struggle specifically against market amoralism, these constitutional ideas should flip
into offering protection of their practices.
In some respects, this argument parallels one made in respect to the First
Amendment protecting the anonymity of campaign contributions made to unpopular
“dissenting” political parties. Government authority over the structure of elections, and
thus general authority to regulate the fairness of political campaigns,44 should allow
government to mandate disclosure of the identity of campaign contributors. Even so,
the rationale for making the elections more open and more democratic does not apply
when uncloaking the identity of a contributor to basically marginal unpopular political
groups would substantially discourage contributions. In this case, not only does the
rationale of the government regulation not apply, but also the autonomy interests of the
contributor provide a heightened justification for protecting anonymity. When faced
with this issue, the Supreme Court in a sense found a content distinction
constitutionally compelled.45 The Court protected the anonymity of contributors to the
Socialist Workers Party.46 Note that this argument does not suggest general
disempowerment of government in contexts where the structural context gives reason
for governmental power—whether that structure involves elections or markets. Rather,
it shows that sometimes the very rationale for governmental power suggests limits and
exceptions.
Protection of the dissenters’ commercial speech here might still seem in conflict
with my third argument, specifically that the state should have authority to regulate the
use of property as power. This conclusion is right, I believe, as a matter of principle.
And it could be argued that even dissenting commercial enterprises should be required
to find a way to operate—including in relation to their speech—within the legal

44. See C. Edwin Baker, Campaign Expenditures and Free Speech, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 1 (1998).
45. See Geoffrey R. Stone & William P. Marshall, Brown v. Socialist Workers: Inequality
as a Command of the First Amendment, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 583.
46. Brown v. Socialist Workers ‘74 Campaign Comm. (Ohio), 459 U.S. 87 (1982).
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framework that the law provides. Nevertheless, as a matter of legislative policy, here as
elsewhere, the state ought to allow diversity in people’s expression of values. Applying
my interpretation of Seana Shiffrin’s discussion, I tentatively suggest that despite the
state’s declared underlying rationale for market regulation (controlling market
amoralism), expressive freedom ought to prevail. In other words, the state should not
focus on controlling for market amoralism, but rather the exercise of autonomous
choice of these dissenters from the market’s amoralism, regardless of this context of
power.
CONCLUSION
I have described four reasons that the fundamental ideal of speech freedom should
not extend to commercial speech.47 I argued, first, that commercial speech is not an
exercise of freedom because market forces dictate its content. Second, commercial
speech is not an exercise of freedom by morally significant flesh-and-blood individuals
to the extent that the speech is properly attributed to a legally constructed commercial
entity. This attribution always leaves the flesh-and-blood individual free to say what
she wishes when she leaves her commercial role, even when her speech duplicates in
content possible messages of commercial entities. Third, commercial speech is not an
exercise of constitutionally protected freedom because of its integral relation to market
transactions that structurally involve exercises of power subject to state regulation
rather than embodying individual autonomy. Fourth, commercial speech generally
should not be protected to the extent that constitutional rights of free speech ought to
be regarding dissent.
In reasons and result, I join the ranks of John Stuart Mill and most American First
Amendment absolutists—a group that includes Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black and
scholars such as Tom Emerson, Alexander Mieklejohn, John Ely, and Hans Linde—
who all conclude that protection of speech freedom should not extend to commercial
speech. Of possible particular note is my third argument—that the libertarian tradition
makes a fundamental mistake when it tries to connect its emphasis on autonomy and

47. A fifth theory might be that the First Amendment concerns only or primarily political or
democracy-related speech. This argument could proceed in either of two ways. It might focus on
the content of commercial speech, in which case both Redish’s article and the Court in Virginia
Board emphasized that the content of commercial advertising can be politically relevant.
Alternatively, it might focus on the proper political enfranchisement of the speaker and the
contexts in which she is oriented toward the public sphere. See Robert Post, The Constitutional
Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1 (2000); James Weinstein, Speech
Categorization and the Limits of First Amendment Formalism: Lessons from Nike v. Kasky, 54
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1091 (2004). Though this second approach would justify denying
protection to commercial speech, I put it aside because I believe the rationale for protection of
political speech lies in a conception of legitimate government that implies both democracy and
limits on democracy as necessary consequences of a view of legitimate government as
necessarily respecting individual liberty and equality—as Rawls put it, a view of people as “free
and equal.” RAWLS, supra note 25, at 13. This view makes protection of speech based on respect
for individual autonomy more basic than protection of the subsumed category of political
speech. This more expansive view of expressive freedom also, I believe, better describes speech
doctrine and judicial results in the United States.
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liberty to claims about market freedom. On this point at least, John Stuart Mill got it
right: “the principle of individual liberty is not involved in the doctrine of free trade.”48

48. MILL, supra note 39, at 164.

